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POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN HEALTH CARE RATIONING:
IN SEARCH OF A NEW JERUSALEM
HOWARD M. LEICHTERt
INTRODUCTION
In June 1989 the Oregon Legislative Assembly approved a
package of bills that will ration health care for thousands of the
state's poor and uninsured population. In doing so it started a
national debate that shows no signs of abating. Over the last two
years, health care providers, talk show hosts, scholars, print and
media journalists, social advocacy groups, and public policymakers
around the nation have ruminated on the necessity, practicality, and
morality of health care rationing.
1
Clearly the prospect of withholding health services that might
reduce or eliminate human suffering or save human life is an
anathema to some very fundamental American values. In addition,
there is a sense of moral and political discomfort over the fact that
rationing, as it is now proposed in Oregon and contemplated
elsewhere, would primarily apply to the working and non-working
poor and not to the middle and upper-classes.
t Professor of Political Science, Linfield College; Clinical Professor of Public
Health and Preventative Medicine, Oregon Health Services University. The author
wishes to thankJean Thorne, Director, Office of Medical Assistance Programs, for her
patience and generosity in providing information on the Oregon Basic Health
Services Act. In addition, special thanks go to Vanessa Robin Weersing for her
incredibly talented research assistance.
I See Lawrence D. Brown,.The National Politics of Oregon's RationingPlan, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 1991, at 28; Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in
Oregon: The New Accountability, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 7; MichaelJ. Garland
& Romana Hasnain, Health Care in Common: Setting Priorities in Oregon, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 16 (describing Oregon Health Services Commission's
process of prioritizing health services); David C. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities
in Oregon: Cost-effectiveness Meets the Rule of Rescue, 265JAMA 2218(1991) [hereinafter
Health Care Priorities] (describing Oregon's priority-setting process); David C. Hadorn,
The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality ofLife and Public Policy, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Supp. May-June 1991, at 11 [hereinafter Priority-Setting Exercise] (describing
Oregon's prioritization); William B. Stason, Oregon's Bold Medicaid Initiative, 265
JAMA 2237 (1991); H. Gilbert Welch & Eric B. Larson, Dealingwith Limited Resources:
The Oregon Decision to Curtail Fundingfor Organ Transplantation, 319 NEW ENG.J. MED.
171 (1988) (discussing Oregon's decision to extend Medicaid funding rather than to
continue an organ transplant program); Alan L. Otten, Local Groups Attempt to Shape
Policy on Ethics and Economics of Health Issues, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1988, at 27
(discussing the ethical and economic issues of health care rationing).
(1939)
1940 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1939
It is in part because of this latter prospect that rationing has
sensitized students of public policy and political theory to questions
that are often taken for granted in the policy literature. One of
these is the subject of this article: namely, how do we make certain
that the rationing process is an accountable one?2 This concern is
of special interest to students of American politics and democratic
theory because "it is of the essence of democracy that the govern-
ment should be accountable to the people."
3
The generic problem for democratic theorists, from James
Madison and John Stewart Mill to the present, has been how,
specifically, does society ensure that those who make public policy
do so in the public interest. This potential dilemma is what Mill
called the "grand difficulty" of politics. 4 Although the "difficulty"
is a general one, it takes on a rather special significance when the
policy involves values that are as cherished as those of good health
and access to medical care. Indeed, implicit in the very framing of
the question about political accountability in this symposium is the
notion that rationing health care is a unique area of public policy.
There is a sense here that some extraordinary political or moral
imperative requires that particular attention be paid to accountabili-
ty in the allocation of health resources. After all, it hardly seems
likely that the editor of a collection of essays on, for example,
transportation policy or agricultural subsidies, would feel compelled
to highlight, as this symposium does, the issue of political account-
ability.
Why, then, do we pay particular attention to, or make extraordi-
nary provisions for, ensuring accountability in health care rationing?
In this Article, I argue that the putative uniqueness of the policy
values involved in health care rationing places an unusual-and
probably unnecessary-burden on those who seek to insure
accountability in the process. In addition to the high value placed
on health care in America, the political and moral unpalatability of
rationing and the intrinsic ambiguity of the concept of accountabili-
2 Although I will suggest later that the term "accountability" is anything but
unambiguous, for the present I will rely on a fairly traditional definition: Political
accountability refers to the exercise of popular control, typically through elections,
over public officials and the actions for which they are legally and morally answerable.
In this article, my concern will be with those who make the laws rather than those
who administer them (i.e., bureaucratic accountability).
3J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 268 (1979).
4 CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 32 (1970) (quoting
Mill).
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ty make the burden of ensuring accountability in health care
rationing more onerous. None of these problems, however, has
dissuaded proponents of rationing to search for and find a New
Jerusalem of political accountability in the form of "participatory
democracy." In Oregon, the one sustained application of participa-
tory democracy to rationing suggests that, although this approach
may be useful as a supplement, it is unlikely to replace other more
traditional methods of citizen control over public policy.
Before proceeding further, I want to make clear which aspects
of the health care rationing issue I will not discuss in this Article.
First, I neither accept nor reject the need for rationing health care
in America. Although this issue lies at the very heart of the national
debate, I will leave it to others in this symposium and elsewhere to
resolve this point.5 At least one state believes rationing is neces-
sary and thus has moved the issue from the status of a hypothetical,
academic question to a pressing political debate. Second, for the
purposes of this discussion, I assume the term "rationing" means a
deliberately designed policy to allocate scarce health resources
among individuals, rather than the implicit health care rationing
that occurs daily in this country. Third, I do not question the ability
of policymakers to devise a fair and effective rationing scheme.
However consequential this issue might be in the overall debate, it
is peripheral to health care rationing from the perspective of
democratic theory.6 Finally, I will not enter into the "is health care
a right?" debate which, it seems to me, is central to the initial
decision to ration, but not to devising a strategy for political accountability.
7
5 See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, RationingMedical Progress: The Way to Affordable Health
Care, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1810, 1813 (1990) (asserting that Americans should
ration health care).
6 For a further discussion of this point, see PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE:
THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE (1990); James F. Blumstein, Rationing
Medical Resources: A Constitutiona Legal and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345
(1981); Charles J. Dougherty, Setting Health Care Priorities: Oregon's Next Steps,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at 1; Health Care Priorities,supra note 1, at 17-
18; Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 1, at 11.
7 See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF
HEALTH SERVICES 11-47 (1983) (detailing an ethical framework for access to health
care); Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 55, 59-78 (1984); Michael A. Dowell, State and Local Government Legal
Responsibilities to Provide Medical Care for the Poor, 3 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 3-7 (1988-89);
Charles Fried, Equality and Rights in Medical Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1976,
at 29; David Mechanic, Rationing Health Care: Public Policy and the Medical
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Having said all this, I will now consider the difficultiei confront-
ing policymakers in any effort to create a rationing program that
effectively holds political leaders answerable to their constituents.
I. "HEALTH CARE, THOUGH, IS DIFFERENT."
8
The difficulty begins with the fact that political accountability
requires, among other things, an attentive, well-informed public,
which is capable of both understanding political issues and
evaluating its own interests in light of proposed public policies.
Unfortunately, the conventional wisdom among normative and
empirical theorists is that the average citizen is supremely ill-
equipped in these regards.
9
This characterization is perhaps most applicable in the case of
health care; citizen ignorance flourishes in an environment of
limited and inaccessible information, resulting in the inability of lay
people to evaluate health care policies. 10 Given the mysteries of
modern medicine and the esoteric vocabulary used by its practitio-
ners, it is hardly surprising that most people feel quite inadequate
evaluating the performance of either the health care they receive
personally or the health care policies proposed by government.
One could argue, of course, that in terms of its incomprehensi-
bility and inaccessibility, health care is no different from many other
technology-based public policies. Health care, however, has a
uniquely personal aspect. The aphorism that "if you have your
health, you have everything," and the empirical evidence on the
importance that Americans attach to good health, suggest that
health care occupies a special, if not unique, place in our value
system and produces extraordinary political circumstances.1 1 One
Marketplace, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1976, at 34.
8 MENZEL, supra note 6, at 117.
9 Giovanni Sartori, a keen student of democratic theory asks: "What is the
information base of public opinion?" GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRAcY REVISITED 103 (1987). His response does not bode well for citizen
control over a rationing policy. 'Here the answer is crushingly, throughout
mountains of evidence, of a similar tenor: The state of inattention, non-interest, sub-
information, perceptive distortion, and, finally, plain ignorance of the average citizen
never ceases to surprise the observer." Id.
10 See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal " Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues,
59 TEx. L. REV. 1401, 1409-10 (1981).
11 Ten years ago the Gallup Poll asked Americans what they deemed most
important to them personally. The two most frequently mentioned social values were
a good family life (by 82% of the respondents) and good physical health (81%). See
Intangibles Valued More Than Belongings, GALLUP REP. No. 198, March 1982, at 3, 5,
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consequence of all this is that the health care policy environment is
one in which effective citizen control is rendered particularly
difficult.
1 2
It would seem that rational policy choice and effective citizen
evaluation-both essential ingredients in any process of political
accountability-are unusually diminished or inhibited by feelings of
vulnerability and anxiety accompanying the contemplation of
personal illness. There is then a perception that the personal stakes
of illness, and the consequent need for health care access, are
extraordinary. Mary Ann Bailey has noted that "[flor most people,
health care is special because of its importance in preventing pain
and suffering, preserving the ability to pursue a normal life plan,
providing information and relieving worry, and reflecting a
community's concern for its members."13 Paul Menzel states the
point somewhat differently: "[I]llness touches on the most universal
and mysterious human experiences of birth, death, and the
contingency of life ....-. Thus, health care enjoys a special
place of importance not simply because it helps alleviate or
eliminate pain and suffering, but because it may be instrumental to
our achieving most of what we want out of life.
The sense of incompetence and vulnerability that most of us feel
in the face of illness is reinforced by a sense of impotence. We are
beginning to recognize that a good deal of morbidity and premature
mortality is self-inflicted, the result of irresponsible life-style choices
that are by-and-large controllable. The view, however, still prevails
that most ill health is the result of random, biological forces, over
10 & 17.
12 Not everyone agrees that health care should enjoy a special place in public
policy considerations. David Friedman, for example, argues that:
It is often claimed that health care is special because it is a 'need' whereas
most other things are only 'wants.' This seems to reduce either to the
assertion that health care is a need because it is necessary for life, and life
is infinitely valuable relative to other desirable things, or that it is a need
because the kind and amount of health care which an individual requires is
a matter of objective fact, to be determined by experts, rather than a matter
of preferences. The claim that life is infinitely valuable, while rhetorically
satisfying, is difficult to defend, whether as a proposition about how people
do act or about how they should act.
David D. Friedman, Comments on "Rationing' Medical Care: Processes for Defining
Adequacy, in THE PRICE OF HEALTH 185, 186 (George J. Agich & Charles E. Begley
eds., 1986).
13 Mary Ann Baily, Rationing Medical Care: ProcessesforDefiningAdequay, in THE
PRICE OF HEALTH, supra note 12, at 165, 165.
14 MENZEL, supra note 6, at 122.
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which we have no control and which pose potentially fatal or at least
debilitating consequences.
Because health is so highly valued yet largely misunderstood by
the general public, any attempt to deliberately limit access to health
care is certain to create substantial burdens on efforts to insure
citizen control over such a rationing policy. Americans, historically,
do not take well to rationing of any sort.15 When it comes to
rationing health care, there is a special dilemma: Americans have
difficulty "in being able to think about [health care] rationing as a
moral activity at all."16 The initial problem here is an obvious one.
Although rationing is designed to equitably and impersonally
impose limits on health services available to all people within a
certain category (for example, Medicaid recipients), it will still be
viewed largely in terms of denying individual, identifiable human
beings-as opposed to statistical "persons"-care that may lead to the
prolongation of life or diminution of suffering. Saying "no" to
those in need of health care is neither a congenial exercise nor
consistent with prevailing cultural values and attitudes toward the
sanctity of human life.
17
Rationing, then, will place most Americans in a morally
uncomfortable position. This situation is exacerbated by the highly
technical nature of the process. The Oregon plan, for example,
involves prioritizing over 700 condition/treatment pairs. Priority
is based partially upon a highly technical and somewhat abstract
calculation of how each relates to quality of well-being (QWB)
associated with the nature of the condition and the quality of life
resulting from providing or denying treatment.18 Specifically,
Oregon adopted an approach called "quality-adjusted life year"
(QALY) that incorporates both the quality of life and the effect on
life expectancy from treating particular conditions.'
9
15 See, e.g., Stephen W. Sears, Sony, No Gas, 30 AM. HERITAGE 4, 5-17 (1979)
(describing America's Gasoline rationing program in the 1940s).
16 LARRYR. CHURCHILL, RATIONING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: PERCEPTIONS AND
PRINCIPLES OFJUSTICE 32 (1987); see also Karen Hansen, The Ethical Dilemma of Health
Care, ST. LEGISLATURES, Oct. 1989, at 9, 11 (examining whether people have a right
to health care).
17 See Norman Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States Is So Hard:
Cost Containment Justice, and Provider Autonomy, 314 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1380 (1986);
Blumstein, supra note 6, at 1352-54.
18 See Hadorn, Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 1, at 11-12.
19 See id. at 11. For extensive background on the process of developing the
Oregon plan, see OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMMISSION, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH
SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE passim (1991) [hereinafter
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The sophisticated and esoteric nature of this approach raises the
fundamental question of how well prepared the average citizen is to
judge the relative merits of treating, say, acute urticaria (number
657 on the Oregon priority list) versus candidiasis (number 658).2o
Some, like David Hadorn, believe that the Oregon proposal is an
improvement over the more traditional, rationing-type health care
choices that citizens are asked to judge (for example, the funding of
organ transplants versus neonatal programs or increased spending
on Medicaid versus school lunch programs). They believe that even
though most people are ill-equipped to evaluate the efficacy of
specific programs, they have an experiential basis for judging health
outcomes.
21
Any rationing plan, whether based upon the prioritization of
programs or outcomes, will sorely test the ability and willingness of
citizens to judge the morality and efficacy of a public policy that
represents a rejection of the most fundamental of American values.
Blumstein has summarized the problem:
Pragmatically, formulating standards is difficult because of the
variety of problems and nuances that inevitably arise in the
medical services context. More importantly, there is the specter
of government openly renouncing the widely held belief in the
sanctity of human life and publicly acknowledging that society is
unwilling to expend the funds necessary to preserve human life
and health.
22
One can hardly imagine a less auspicious set of circumstances
for citizens to evaluate public policy and to judge those who make
it.
II. WHO IS ACCOUNTABLE To WHOM, FOR WHAT, AND WHEN?
Thus far I have suggested that health care in general, and
rationing in particular, provide an unusual array of problems that
may make it difficult for citizens to hold public officials answerable
for the consequences of rationing. The problem is exacerbated by
OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMMISSION].2 0 See OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMMISSION, supra note 19, app.J.
21 Priority-Settling Exercise, supra note 1, at 11. Hadorn concludes: "Everyone has
been ill at one time or another and has experienced at least temporary periods of
disability. Most people are in a position to recall what care can do, and therefore can
offer opinions about various states of health that are better informed than their
opinions about programs." Id. at 15.
22 Blumstein, supra note 6, at 1371.
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the fact that accountability is itself an elusive and complex concept.
Above, I defined political accountability as the exercise of popular
control over public officials for the actions they have taken or have
caused to be taken.23 This definition is, however, both conceptual-
ly and behaviorally inadequate. "Accountability" may be used in
one of at least three ways to define the relationship among people,
policymakers, and public policy.
First, political accountability is sometimes defined in narrow,
legal terms, or what Leon Hurwitz calls "the state as defendant."
24
This definition envisions a system of redress available to citizens
who believe they have been wronged by the state. In the case of
rationing, this presumably might involve the right of a citizen to sue
either the government, or health care providers as agents of the
government, for a harm that allegedly resulted from the denial of
a medical service not covered under a rationing plan. Oregon
legislators, for example, clearly had this definition in mind when
they exempted health care providers from "criminal prosecution,
civil liability or professional disciplinary action for failing to provide
a service which the Legislative Assembly has not funded or has
eliminated from its funding" under the state's rationing law.
25
Legal challenges to a state for harm resulting from the unavail-
ability of a medical procedure that is not covered under a rationing
plan might be based upon the claim that health care is an entitle-
ment and to refuse services because of rationing is a denial of due
process. It should be noted, however, that the courts have not been
especially sympathetic to such pleas.
26
If the idea of the "state as defendant" defines accountability
narrowly, a second interpretation, namely "moral accountability,"
23 See supra note 2.
24 For the development of the state as defendant as a legal principle, see LEON
HURWrrZ, THE STATE AS DEFENDANT: GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
REDRESS OF INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCES (1981); John H.W. Hinchcliff, The Limits of
Implied Constitutional Damages Actions: New Boundaries for Bivens, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1238, 1243-48 (1980) (discussing the scope of the implied damages action for
remedying violations of individual rights).
25 OR. REV. STAT. § 414.745 (1991).
26 SeeJames F. Blumstein, Distinguishing Government's Responsibility in Rationing
Public and Private Medical Resources, 60 TEX. L. REV. 899, 912-16 (1982).
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broadens accountability considerably. 27 This particular construc-
tion posits a set of implicit, rather than explicit, moral obligations
which government has toward its citizens, but which may not be part
of its legal responsibilities. 28 For example, discussions of rationing
often involve a reference to a "decent minimum" or "adequate
level" of health care that each citizen should enjoy, despite the fact
no such standard exists or has any legal status. The implication
here is that the state has a moral, if not legal, obligation to provide
a certain level of care that common sense or medical wisdom has
identified as the point below which the well-being of a person would
be jeopardized.
The claim that government has a moral responsibility toward its
citizens is typically limited to areas in which human health, welfare,
or safety is endangered. Hence, we speak of holding the Nazis
morally accountable for the Holocaust, the Johnson and Nixon
administrations for the war in Vietnam, or local officials for failure
to adopt or enforce safety codes. Rarely do we speak of holding
public officials morally accountable for the consequences of a
capital gains tax, a highway beautification program, or changes in
zoning policy.
Because the concept of a moral obligation of government is both
more imprecise and highly charged than, say, that of legal responsi-
bility, it is more difficult to identify who is to be held morally
accountable and for what. Public law routinely specifies legal
responsibility, but rarely moral responsibility. In addition, there are
some practical limitations to ascribing moral accountability. As
Dennis Thompson has noted: "Because many different officials
contribute in many ways to decisions, and policies of government,
it is difficult even in principle to identify who is morally responsible
for political outcomes."2 9 Thompson calls this "the problem of
27 For a discussion of the distinction between legal and moral accountability, see
Dennis F. Thompson, Moral Responsibility and the New York City Fiscal Crisis, in PUBLIC
DUTIES: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 266, 266-67 (Joel L.
Fleishman et al. eds., 1981);John Ladd, The Ethics of Participation, in PARTICIPATION
IN POLITICS 98, 116-118 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975).28 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 211-30 (1968).
29 Dennis F. Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many
Hands, 74 AM. POL. SC. REV. 905, 905 (1980). Moral responsibility is also sometimes
thought of as the obligation that citizens have to one another. This interpretation is
very much a part of the "participatory democracy" model advocated and practiced in
Oregon, and to which I will return shortly. Thus, in referring to the series of public
meetings held in Oregon to gauge community values on health issues, two members
of Oregon Health Decisions, the guiding light of citizen involvement in Oregon
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many hands," and it underscores the difficulty of applying typically
vague notions of morality to judgments about responsibility.
The third and most common use of political accountability has
already been mentioned-namely popular control through what
Madison called "the restraint of frequent elections."30 Thus,
public officials who fail to fulfill campaign promises, or to anticipate
constituent concerns, presumably will be held answerable by the
voters for their actions. Or, as Madison noted with regard to the
House of Representatives, it "is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people." Just how effective this control is in practice is open to
considerable doubt. Empirical evidence indicates that voters rarely
throw incumbents out of office, and that elites do not always hold
views identical to those whom they represent.
31
Whichever meaning or meanings one attaches to the notion of
accountability, it is necessary to specify to whom, and for what we
expect public officials to be answerable. It is more than a mere
exercise in pedantry to suggest that the answers to these questions
are neither self-evident nor inconsequential. In the context of
health care rationing, simply saying policymakers must be answer-
able to the people for a fair and effective rationing program is at
the very least superficial and perhaps even misleading and/or
undesirable depending upon the stated aims of the policy itself.
In the first place, although policymakers are theoretically
answerable to "the people," not all of the people are equally
affected by, or concerned about, each policy. In the case of
rationing, health care providers, insurance carriers, social advocacy
rationing, commented that: "Because of these meetings we can confirm that there
is a pervasive concern that we, the entire American community, should hold ourselves
accountable for the fairness, prudence, and common welfare created by our health
care institutions and practices." Garland & Hasnain, supra note 1, at 17. See also
Dougherty, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the values at stake in prioritizing health
care).
30 THE FEDERALST No. 57, at 344 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1989).
31 See e.g., Stephen D. Shaffer & George A. Chressanthis, Accountability and U.S.
Senate Elections: A Multivariate Analysis, 44 W. POL. Q. 625 (1991) (examining the
extent to which senators are held accountable to voters); see also Eric M. Uslaner &
Ronald E. Weber, Policy Congruence and American State Elites: Descriptive Representation
versus Electoral Accountability, 45J. POL. 183, 185-93 (1983) (examining the extent of
congruence between the public and three elite groups: county political leaders, state
legislators, and state bureaucrats). For a more theoretical discussion of the problem
of relying on elections as the chief instrument for insuring elite accountability, see
NORMAN P. BARRY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN POLITICAL THEORY 200-230
(1981).
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groups, and health maintenance organizations all lay claim to a
special interest in the process and outcome of any policy that will
determine health resource allocations. The poor, who are likely to
bear the burden of any rationing scheme, also have a special interest
in health resource allocations. Assuming for the moment that some
forum of accountability beyond that which is provided by "the
restraint of frequent elections" or of routine legislative oversight is
desirable, then it will be necessary to specify who among the
population has a genuine interest in participation in the process of
insuring answerability in the formation and implementation of
health care rationing.
The belief that those who are most directly affected by rationing
should be accorded a special role in ensuring elite accountability is
not shared by everyone. Indeed, some would argue that responsibil-
ity for the determination and consequences of a rationing scheme
can best be achieved when the entire community has a sense of
ownership and obligation for rationing. This, as I will document
below, is an essential part of the participatory democracy model
adopted in Oregon.
This community responsibility requirement arises from both
practical and ethical considerations. In practical political terms, the
broader the constituency that identifies with rationing, the more
likely it is that popular oversight will be effective in holding
policymakers answerable for the content and consequences of health
resource allocation decisions. From an ethical perspective, social
justice and common vulnerability dictate that health care rationing
should be a product of community involvement. This position is
advanced by Larry Churchill: "A just health care system, whatever
its final shape, requires a recognition of our sociality and mutual
vulnerability to disease and death." 3 2 Health care, in this view, is
a public good, and therefore the responsibility for any allocation
decisions must be assigned to the entire community.
The question of to whom a rationing policy should be made
accountable inevitably raises the question: for what should
policymakers be held accountable? One way to answer this question
is to ask another: What are the goals of rationing for which we want
to hold policymakers responsible? The problem here, of course, is
that there are several, often incompatible, aims. For example,
rationing assumes scarce resources. In the case of health care, this
32 CHURCHILL, supra note 16, at 135.
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scarcity refers not to medical personnel or equipment, but to the
ability or willingness of the public sector to pay for the care of all
those who are unable to pay for themselves. This is what Callahan
calls "the simple" and "true proposition" about health care in
America: "that we cannot have everything we want in health
care."s
Implicit in this view of rationing is the idea that by limiting
access to certain medical care procedures, we will be able to save
money and to reallocate the savings in order to purchase care for
those who are currently denied access. The difficulty with this is
that it is unclear if we are to hold public officials accountable for
saving money and expanding access, or just in expanding access.
What if a rationing program results in universal access but ends up
costing the taxpayers more money? Have public policymakers
behaved responsibly?
There are other problems in specifying the goals of rationing.
Access to health care is an instrumental value rather than a goal in
itself. Access to health care should presumably lead to, among
other things, decreased premature mortality, prolongation of life,
reduction in human pain and suffering, and, perhaps, increased
economic productivity. Some of these things, of course, are almost
impossible to measure. But what about those that we can measure?
What if mortality and morbidity rates do not decline? Is this
something for which we want to hold public officials accountable?
The calculation of goal achievement in expanding access is further
complicated by the fact that access to health care is just one of many
factors that may reduce morbidity, premature mortality rates, and
human suffering. Other, non-medical factors include improved
nutrition, housing, education, and job opportunities.
Unless we are willing to stipulate that social justice, in the form
of universal access to a decent minimum or adequate level of health
care-not equal access in the sense "that whatever is available to any
shall be available to all"34 --is the principle aim of rationing, then
it will be quite difficult to judge whether or not policymakers have
acted responsibly.
The difficulty, however, does not stop here. Do we want to
judge political accountability merely in terms of outcomes and
consequences, or in terms of process as well? Would proponents of
33 Daniel Callahan, Allocating Health Resources, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May
1988, at 14, 18.
34 Fried, supra note 7, at 30.
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rationing be satisfied if access were expanded to all the uninsured,
but in a way in which the poor, or health care providers, were not
consulted in the formulation of the program? One might argue, for
example, that given the uncertain and complicated nexus between
health care and health, the most that we should hold public officials
accountable for is the nature of the process of rationing (for
example, publicity, opportunities for participation, and provisions
for correcting policy performance, etc.), perhaps the altruism of
their intentions, but not the consequences of their actions.3
5
Whether we want to hold public officials answerable for process
or consequence, or both, we must also specify from whose perspec-
tive we are making such a judgment. A rationing plan that
expanded access to all the uninsured, but reduced provider
compensation or the role of private insurance carriers, will be
evaluated quite differently depending on one's perspectives and
goals. It is unrealistic to assume that because rationing involves the
noble social value of guaranteeing access to the multitudes, that
somehow principles of democratic "neutrality" or "undistorted
communications," a Habermasian term, will prevail over interest
group politics.3 6 Rationing will become heavily politicized and will
require, as much as any other issue of public policy, some structural
guarantees to ensure that the process or its content remain
accountable. The problem, as I have suggested, is in deciding how
this will occur, who will be involved, and for what shall government
be held answerable?
The difficulty, as some advocates of health care reform see it, is
that existing mechanisms for holding officials responsible for their
actions are inadequate, especially given the stakes involved in
rationing. As a result, there has been renewed interest in examining
the effectiveness of existing structures of accountability and
searching for possible alternatives to these. It is this debate that I
now address.
35 For a discussion that emphasizes the importance of participation in judging
accountability, see Ladd, supra note 27, at 116-18.
36 For the canonical source on the "corruption" of politics by client groups, see
THEODOREJ. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED
STATES 42 (2d ed. 1987).
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III. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND HEALTH CARE RATIONING
The "grand difficulty" of holding political elites answerable for
their actions has become the grand frustration of American political
theory. The problem begins with a widespread "realization, even in
liberal democratic circles, that direct, participatory democracy is an
impossibility in large societies."3 7 If true-and I will return to this
assertion shortly-the claim casts doubt upon one of the most
fundamental tenets of democratic theory. John Dewey wrote that
"[t]he keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed as the
necessity for the participation of every mature human being in
formation of the values that regulate the living of men together."
3 8
Theburden for classical democratic theory here is that public policy
becomes less the expression of popular preference, directly acted
upon through public action, and more an elite choice which is
largely removed from popular influence. Explanations orjustifica-
tions for the fact that the elites, not the masses, govern range from
the structural, such as the fact that power in any large scale
organization will inevitably be concentrated in the hands of the few,
to the empirical point that few people have the time, skills, or
inclination to participate in politics even in its least demanding
form-elections.
3 9
The challenge for modern democratic theory, then, has been to
accommodate political accountability within a structure of elite rule.
This challenge has been met by offering alternatives to direct rule.
Two in particular merit brief consideration. The first already has
been mentioned in passing and is perhaps the most cherished of all,
namely electoral accountability. This view suggests that the masses
no longer directly make public policy-if they ever did outside the
7 KENNETH PREwrrr & ALAN STONE, THE RULING ELITES 184 (1973).
38 THOMAS R. DYE & L. HARMON ZEIGLER,, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN
UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITIcs 9 (5th ed. 1981) (quotingJohn
Dewey, Democracy and Educational Administration, SCHOOL AND SOCIETY, Apr. 3, 1937).
39 Many scholars have identified the inevitable reliance on elites, not the masses,
to govern. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 242-68 (1956) (theorizing
that government is an automatic machine, regulated by a balancing of competing
interests which are difficult to disturb); GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS 103-19,
329-37 (Hannah D. Kahn trans., 1939) (detailing the history and theory of the ruling
class); Uslaner & Weber, supra note 31 (examining the merits of the theses of
descriptive representation and accountability). For a discussion of voting behavior,
see GERALD M. POMPER, ELECTIONS IN AMERICA: CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN
DEMOCRATIC PoLrICs 129-37, 240-43, 246-52 (1968); SARTORI, supra note 9, at 108-
10, 133-41.
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New England town meeting. Rather, they choose those who do
make it.
In his classic formulation of the issue, Joseph Schumpeter
argued that political decisions are arrived at through a process "in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people's vote."40 Thus, voters have
the opportunity to periodically reward policymakers for faithfully
reflecting popular wishes, or punishing them for ignoring those
wishes. Political leaders are held accountable by anticipating citizen
preferences and reactions. According to Jack Walker:
The average citizen still has some measure of effective political
power under this system, even though he does not initiate policy,
because of his right to vote (if he chooses) in regularly scheduled
elections. The political leaders, in an effort to gain support at the
polls, will shape public policy to fit the citizens' desires. By
anticipating public reaction the elite grants the citizenry a form of
indirect access to public policy making .... 
41
The difficulties with assuring accountability through electoral
representation were noted earlier.42 To reiterate and elaborate on
the point: low rates of voter turnout, split-ticket voting, citizen
ignorance about incumbent and challenger policy positions, political
elite ambiguity on their policy preferences, the absence of a
disciplined party system, the division and fragmentation of political
power, and often, partisan control between levels of government
and among branches of government are just some of the problems
that weaken the theory and practice of electoral accountability. It
is hardly surprising that not everyone takes comfort from this
alternative to direct democracy.
43
The widespread indictment of the American voter as unin-
formed and uninvolved has led to an alternative view that tries to
accommodate a more passive and less well-informed citizenry than
is required by either direct democracy or electoral representation.
At the heart of this theory, called pluralist democracy, is the
recognition "that in a complex, urban, industrial society, individual
4 0 
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIAIISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (3d ed.
1947).
41 Jack L. Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, in APOLITICAL
PoLITICS: A CRITIQUE OF BEHAvIORALISM 199, 201 (Charles A. McCoy & John
Playford eds., 1967); see also POMPER, supra note 39, at 64-67 (discussing the influence
of elections on shaping government policy).
42 See supra notes 8-10, 30-31 & 37-39 and accompanying text.
43 See PREWlrr & STONE, supra note 37, at 203-09.
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participation in decision making is not possible and has inevitably
and necessarily given way to interaction-bargaining, accommoda-
tion, and compromise-among leaders of institutions and organiza-
tions in society."
44
Individual interests, according to pluralists, are articulated,
pursued, and protected by the leadership of the social, economic,
and political organizations and institutions to which Americans
belong in great numbers. Through the various tools at their
disposal (for example, lobbying, electioneering, litigation, and
public relations), interest groups help bring the concerns of their
members to policymakers, influence policy choices, and ultimately
hold leaders responsible for the consequences of their actions.
Thus, "[g]overnment is held responsible not by individual citizens
but by leaders of institutions, organized interest groups, and
political parties."45 Pluralists do not view group membership and
activity as replacing voting and elections, but rather as a supplement
to them. Of course for those who do not vote on a regular basis, or
who do not vote in a "rational" manner (voting for those who most
closely reflect their own policy choices), group membership
becomes the only opportunity for citizen influence.
Although pluralist democracy may be the most widely accepted
view of American democracy among academics today, it is also
among the most widely criticized. Scholars have taken pluralism to
task for many of its descriptive and prescriptive assertions and
implications, but only two of these merit discussion here.
4 6
First, not all people belong to interest groups and, in fact, the
least well educated and the least affluent are also the least likely to
belong. In the context of health care rationing, this means that
those who are most likely to be affected by rationing, such as the
working and non-working poor, are the least likely to be represent-
ed by interest groups. As E.E. Schattsneider remarked a number of
years ago: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly
44 DYE & ZEIGLER, supra note 38, at 13.
45 Id.
46 For critiques of pluralism, see DYE & ZEIGLER, supra note 38, at 13-16; LowI,
supra note 36, passim; PREwrrr & STONE, supra note 37, at 215-20; Charles W.
Anderson, Political Design and the Representation of Interests, 10 COMP. POL. STUD. 127
(1977); William E. Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF
PLURAusM 3 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969) (arguing that the conventional pluralistic
interpretations of American politics are defective empirically, normatively and
ideologically); Donald W. Keim, Participation in Contemporay Democratic Theories, in
PARTICIPATION IN POLITICs, supra note 27, at 1.
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chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90
percent of the people cannot get into the pressure system."
47
Second, even. if they are represented, not all groups have equal
resources, access, or influence; the playing field is anything but level
in interest group politics. It is not unreasonable to predict, for
example, that in the context of health care rationing the health
provider industry will have more political influence than advocates
for the poor or the poor themselves. In fact, as argued below, this
is precisely what happened in Oregon.48 These and other criti-
cisms have led many to conclude, as Charles Anderson has, that
"[i]nterest group pluralism does not provide a sufficient basis for a
policy of interest representation. It is not plausible as a model of
institutional design in a democratic society."
49
A theoretical effort to reconcile elite rule and popular account-
ability is the Platonic notion of an enlightened elite that has
internalized the norms of civic virtue, tolerance, and other demo-
cratic values. 50 The modern incarnation of this idea is based upon
some rather convincing empirical evidence that these values are
more prevalent among the nation's political leadership than its
electorate.5 Among the reasons for the contrast between elite
and mass values are that the members of the elite are better
educated, more likely to be exposed to civil libertarian ideals, and
more likely to interact with others committed to these ideals. By
extension it is assumed that among the internalized values of the
elite is that of acting responsively and responsibly. In this modern
version of noblesse oblige, political accountability emerges from an
elite culture that incorporates an attentiveness to citizen needs and
preferences.
47 E.E. SCHATTSNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960).
48 See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
49 Anderson, supra note 46, at 137.
50 See PREWrIT & STONE, supra note 37, at 188-97 (discussing the enlightened
elite).
1 For the classic work on this subject, see SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM,
CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A CROSS-SECTION OF THE NATION SPEAKS ITS
MIND 26-27 (1955) (finding that community leaders are more likely than the average
person in the population to respect the civil rights of those of whom they disapprove).
See also HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT
AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 418-27 (1983) (finding that leaders in a
democratic society are more likely than the average citizen to honor and protect the
liberties of others).
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How comfortable should we feel relying on the ethos of
democratic elitism to guarantee political accountability? As an
empirical matter, it appears we ought to feel uncomfortable with
this reliance. A number of observers have found "the record of the
elite is not promising."5 2 The Platonic ideal requires a greater
degree of selflessness, self-restraint, and self-abnegation than the
record will support. The post World War II era, from McCarthyism
to Vietnam to Watergate to Iran-Contra, hardly leaves one comfort-
ed by the prospect of elites guarding the hen house of democracy.
The Platonic model also emphasizes procedural concerns, such as
elections, tolerance, and free speech, but not substantive ones.
53
Thus, although this model might well produce an elite that is
accountable to the masses in terms of protecting procedural rights,
it is less clear that they would, for example, respond to popular
demand for an adequate level of health care for all.
IV. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY REDUX
Scholarly concern over the apparent ineffectiveness of electoral
representation, pluralist democracy, and democratic elitism to
insure popular control over public policies has led to a search for
a democratic alternative. Ironically enough, the quest has led some
back to "the people." The idea here, hardly a new one, is that
citizens should be reinserted into the process of directly making
public policy in their own communities. The irony, of course, is
that each of the theories of democracy reviewed above was a
response to the charge that the classical democratic ideal of citizen
-participation was unrealizable. Walker has stated: "The concept of
an active, informed, democratic citizenry, the most distinctive
feature of the traditional [democratic] theory, is the principal object
of attack. On empirical grounds it is argued that very few such
people can be found in Western societies.
" 54
After years, really centuries, of being relegated by democratic
theorists to the essentially defensive role of controlling (holding
accountable) the political elite, advocates of participatory democracy
want to place citizens back in the business of actually making policy.
Advocates of participatory democracy argue that the preconditions
52 PREWrrT & STONE, supra note 37, at 193; see also DYE & ZEIGLER, supra note 38,
at 20-23 (noting that although elites are more committed than the masses to
democratic values, "they frequently abandon these values in crisis periods.").
53 See PREwrrT & STONE, supra note 37, at 196-97.
5 Walker, supra note 41, at 199-200.
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for such a venture, namely knowledge, time, a sense of civic-as
opposed to private-obligation, and a geographically manageably
sized community, all thought to be absent, have simply been stifled.
People want to become involved, if for no other reason than
disillusionment with politicians. In addition, citizens are better
educated, more knowledgeable about, and capable of engaging in,
community-wide decision making than at any time in history.
Benjamin Barber, a major and influential proponent of participatory
democracy, or what he calls "strong democracy," argues that people
are naturally drawn to political activity, possess civic virtue, and
have the ability to make reasonable, rational, and selfless choices.
55
Barber is not a Pollyanna who believes that citizen self-govern-
ment will replace representative government. Rather, he argues the
participation will be a matter of degree, albeit a qualitatively
important degree: "Active citizens govern themselves directly here,
not necessarily at every level and in every instance, but frequently
enough and in particular when basic policies are being decided and
when significant power is being deployed."
56
Barber argues that strong democracy renders the issue of
political accountability largely irrelevant. Although it may still be
necessary to ensure accountability in administration of policy, he
contends that when the people become the decisionmakers, that is
"self-government by citizens rather than representative government
in the name of citizens," the need for external control over public
policymaking disappears. 57 In fact, Barber argues that the whole
concept of accountability has perverted and eviscerated true
democracy:
It may also explain the civic climate-the political style-of passive
distrust that has made America at once a bastion of private rights
and a graveyard of public action. When the citizenry is a watch-
dog that waits with millennial patience for its government to make
a false move but that submits passively to all other legitimate
5 5 See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEW AGE at xiv (1984) (claiming that "strong democracy is the only viable form
modern democratic politics can take, and that unless it takes a participatory form,
democracy will pass from the political scene along with the liberal values it makes
possible"). For another, somewhat less sanguine, discussion of participatory
democracy, see C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 93-
115 (1977) (arguing that more participation in our present political system is not only
desirable but possible).
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governmental activity, citizenship very quickly deteriorates into a
latent function.
58
According to advocates of strong democracy, America will only
regain the spirit and content of democracy by again placing its faith,
and political power, in the hands of the people, or, in Barber's
words, in "unmediated self-government by an engaged citizenry."
59
Barber's ideas were put to a test, at least partially, in Oregon as it
prepared for rationing and it would therefore be useful to review
that experience for the insights it provides into the utility of
participatory democracy as a means of achieving political account-
ability.
Oregon is in many respects an ideal setting for such a noble
experiment. Active citizen involvement in policymaking has a long
and cherished tradition in the state. It was in Oregon, in the early
part of this century, that the initiative and referendum were first
introduced.60 In addition, Oregonians embrace and exemplify a
"moralistic" political subculture in which "both the general public
and politicians conceive of politics as a public activity centered on
some notion of the public good and properly devoted to the
advancement of the public interest."
61
This spirit and tradition are embodied in a grass-roots, nonprof-
it, citizens' advocacy group, Oregon Health Decisions (OHD), which
played an important role in engaging Oregonians directly in the
process of setting health care priorities in the state's rationing plan.
OHD, which traces its origins to the 1982 Governor's Conference
on Health Care for the Medically Poor, includes as one of its goals,
"[t]o promote the involvement of the general public in the process
-8 Id. at 220:
59 Id. at 261. Americans had a brief, but politically important, flirtation with
limited participatory democracy in the form of Community Action programs during
Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. These programs were intended to encourage
"maximum feasible participation" by citizens in federal antipoverty programs. See
LowI, supra note 36, at 226. For less than glowing evaluations of those experiences,
see id. at 211-26; Howard I. Kalodner, Citizen Participation in Emerging Social
Institutions, in PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS, supra note 27, at 161. Participatory
democracy actually has a rather interesting pedigree. The idea was introduced into
the lexicon of American politics in 1962 in the "Port Huron Statement" of the radical
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). It was then coopted, much to the chagrin
of SDS, by the Johnson anti-poverty program. See MILTON VIoRsT, FIRE IN THE
STREETS: AMERICA IN THE 1960S at 191 (1979).
60 MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLrriCs
1990, at 1002 (1990).
61 DANIELJ. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 115-22 (3d ed. 1984).
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of clarifying the health related values of Oregonians and to apply
these values to health policy processes."
62
In 1984 and 1988, OHD conducted a series of community
meetings around the state that engaged Oregonians in discussions
about public values on bioethical issues, and in particular, health
care priorities. 63 These meetings culminated in a Citizens' Health
Care Parliament, which approved resolutions that reflected the
health care values and priorities of Oregonians-or at least of those
who participated in the process." OHD has become the model
for other state organizations. In 1985 the federal Office of Health
Planning, Department of Health and Human Services commissioned
a guide for citizen-based bioethical groups.
65
Oregon Health Decisions (OHD), and its peripatetic founder,
Dr. Ralph Crawshaw, were well known and highly respected in the
state. The idea of citizen involvement in setting health care
priorities, with which OHD had been identified and had experience,
appealed to state political leaders, especially the chief architect and
guiding light of the health reform plan, state Senate President (and
physician) John Kitzhaber. 66 Kitzhaber and other legislators had
taken a great deal of political heat, and suffered a good deal of
genuine personal anguish, in December 1987 when a seven-year boy
from Portland had died of leukemia. The boy's mother, who was
unemployed, learned that the state had ceased funding organ
transplants earlier that year as a way of saving dwindling state
Medicaid funds. The death of the young boy,67 and the appear-
ance before a state legislative committee in January 1988 of friends
and relatives of three transplant candidates, 68 brought uncomfort-
able national attention to the state. As a result of this experience,
Senator Kitzhaber, who became the focus of much of this attention,
decided that if the state had to ration health care for the poor,
which he believed it did, then those decisions should be built upon
a social and political consensus. 69 This consensus was vital to the
62 1989 OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS LONG RANGE PLAN: 1989-1994, at 2.
63 See id. at 1-2.
64 See id. at 2.
6 5 See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 7.
66 Telephone interview with Mark Gibson, Executive Assistant to Oregon Senate
PresidentJohn Kitzhaber (Feb. 20, 1992).
67 See Nat Hentoff, Saving the Most Lives for the Buck, VOICE, May 31, 1988, at 34.
6 See Patrick O'Neill, Attempt to Expand Transplant Aid Fails, OREGONIAN,Jan. 29,
1988, at El.
69 See OREGON STATE SENATE, DISCUSSION PAPER ON SENATE BILL 27, at 7 (1989).
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political and social legitimacy and acceptance of any health resource
allocation plan.
The Basic Health Services Act,70 as the rationing law came to
be known, created an eleven-member Health Services Commission
(HSC), 71 which was to "actively solicit public involvement in a
community meeting process to build a consensus on the values to
be used to guide health resource allocation decisions."72 The
Commission was to accomplish consensus building in the prioritiza-
tion of health services in three ways. First, it would hold a series of
eleven public hearings around the state allowing interested parties
to express their views.73 Second, it authorized OHD to conduct
the kind of community meetings it had held previously.74 Finally,
the HSO commissioned a statewide telephone survey of 1000
Oregonians. 75  The results of the survey were then formally
incorporated into a mathematical cost/utility or "net benefit value"
formula that included data on expected outcomes of given treat-
ments for hundreds of health conditions.
76
After some initial data collection and methodological problems,
which produced a medically and politically unacceptable initial
prioritization list, the HSC ultimately submitted to the legislature a
list of 709 medical condition/treatment pairs. 77 On June 30, 1991,
the Oregon Legislative Assembly approved a budget that would
allow the state to fund health services to the Medicaid population
through number 587 on the priority list.
78
70 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 414.705-.750 (1990).
71 Id. § 414.715(1).
72 See id. § 414.720(2).
73 See Fox & Leichter, supra note 1, at 20.
74 See id. Ultimately, forty-seven forums, attended by over 1000 Oregonians, were
held around the state during which time participants filled out a questionnaire
soliciting their opinions on the relative importance of certain health situations and
cate.ories, and engaged in group discussions of values related to health. See id.
71 See id. at 21. To conform to the principle of incorporating community values
in the prioritization process, the commission used a modified version of the Quality
of Well-Being Scale: "Respondents were asked to rate thirty-one health situations
from 0 (a situation that is 'as bad as death') to 100 (a situation that describes 'good
health')." Id.
76 Id.
77 See OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMMISSION, supra note 19, app. J.
78 The HSC submitted the list of 709 condition/treatment pairs to a public
accounting firm for an actuarial analysis. The firm calculated the monthly per capita
cost for each of the 709 health treatments. Their report provided the legislature with
ten threshold models of services ranging from providing all medicaid recipients with
coverage for 200 of the 709 services (at a per capita monthly cost of $87.12) to all 709
services ($145.15 per capita). The Legislative Assembly authorized the expenditures
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How closely did this procedure conform to the sort of "strong
democracy" advocated by Barber? First, there is evidence suggest-
ing that community values figured prominently in commission
deliberations and the outcome. For example, Amy Klare, one of the
four consumer representatives on the HSC, reported that although
some members, including herself, felt that the high value assigned
to preventive services by Oregonians in the community forums
dictated that such services receive a high priority, some of the
physician members were less convinced about the relative utility of,
say, nutritional supplements and dental check-ups. 79 In the end,
however, the force of expressed community values prevailed, and
preventive health services appeared high on the list.
80
Other evidence, however, paints a less favorable picture of the
process. In our study of the Oregon rationing experience, Daniel
Fox and I found that the process tended to be dominated not by the
people who Wvould be most directly affected by rationing, namely the
poor, but rather by health care interests.8 1 For example, although
OHD had hoped to attract a cross-section of Oregonians to the
community meetings, this did not turn out to be the case. Of the
slightly more than 1,000 people who attended, almost seventy
percent were mental health and other health care workers.
8 2
Although the term workers is not defined, over one-third of the
participants had incomes of $50,000 or more and two-thirds were
college graduates."' Few of those attending were "poor."8 4 In
addition, the health service industry's presence and influence were
substantial during the legislative hearings on the rationing package,
and health care providers were in the majority on the eleven-
member HSC: there were five physicians, one public health nurse,
one social worker, and four "consumers of health care."
8 5
of funds to cover 587, or about 80%, of the services on this list. See OREGON HEALTH
SERVICES COMMISSION, supra note 19, app. I, at 37-44 & exhibit 28-A. For a complete
account of the rationing story, see Fox & Leichter, supra note 1.
79 Telephone interview with Amy Klare, Commissioner, Health Services
Commission (March 18, 1991).
80 See id.
81 See Fox & Leichter, supra note 1, at 24-25.
82 See ROMANA HAsNAN & MICHAEL GARLAND, HEALTH CARE IN COMMON:
REPORT OF THE OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS COMMUNITY MEETINGS PROCESS 29
(1990).
83 See id. at 29.
84 See id. at 30.
85 See OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 3.
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Finally, it is important to note that all of the direct citizen
participation took place after the initial, and critical, decision to
ration health care had been made by the political leadership; there
was no formal solicitation of community sentiment or exercise in
participatory democracy on the actual decision to ration. Similarly,
most of the critical decisions involving the legislation-for example,
the composition of the HSC, the methods for gauging community
sentiment, the determination of whose views to solicit, the commit-
ment to an "adequate level of health care," the limitation on
physician liability, and the decision to fully reimburse health care
providers for the services they would provide under Medicaid-were
decided in the normal legislative process of interest group lobbying,
bargaining, and compromise. In short, the Oregon legislation
resembles the paradigm of participation in a liberal, pluralist
democracy. In this process, as Schumpeter and others correctly
predict,86 the medical professional played a key role.
Having said this, however, there is little doubt in my mind that
the process of rationing health care in Oregon was far more open
to public scrutiny and involvement than is typically the case in
policymaking. In this sense, and in this way, those involved in the
process, including leading health professionals, other community
influentials, and the legislature are more politically accountable for
explicitly rationing health care services in the state. But Kitzhaber
and his staff assert that they have gone further: Oregon, they claim,
is "hold[ing] society accountable for the rationing of health services to the
poor through its legislature."
87
As I have suggested above, given the socially and economically
narrow range of that involvement, this claim may be a bit presump-
tuous. Nevertheless, it is revealing of the philosophy behind
community involvement that the focus here is on societal rather
than political accountability. The Oregon leadership wanted citizens
to buy into and have a sense of ownership of health rationing in the
state. Benjamin Barber would, I suspect, be at least partially pleased
by Oregon's experiment in "strong democracy."
86 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
87 Memorandum from Oregon Senate President's Office to Daniel Fox and
Howard Leichter (December 26, 1990) (on file with author).
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CONCLUSION
Does, or indeed should, the Oregon effort to engage citizens in
the rationing of health care provide a model for other states? Can
Oregon's experiment, however far short it might fall of Barber's
ideal, work in other places? There are two points that I would make
in this regard. First, as suggested above, Oregon is in many respects
an ideal laboratory for an experiment in quasi-strong democracy.
The state has a tradition of innovation and plebiscitarian democra-
cy-it is relatively small and socially homogeneous-and it was
fortunate to have an existing organization in the form of Oregon
Health Decisions that had the experience, leadership, and respect
necessary to engage in such an exercise. These conditions are not
unique to Oregon-a number of states now have grass-roots,
bioethical groups modeled after OHD-but they are not wide-
spread. 8
Second, no one can or would claim that Oregon has come up
with a successful alternative to existing mechanisms of political or
social accountability. The problems identified in this Article, which
are generic to any attempt to ensure that public policy serves the
public interest, remain. Physicians in Oregon, for example, define
accountability differently than do representatives of the Oregon
Health Action Council, an umbrella organization representing more
than seventy labor, senior citizen, minority, and low income groups.
Resource differentials among groups in our pluralist society remain
a reality of life that efforts at participatory democracy are unlikely
to erase.
Is the Oregon approach an improvement over relying strictly on
elections, or interest group representation, or elite guardianship of
the commonweal? In my judgement it is. How much of an
improvement is open to question. In any event, this experiment
should be viewed as a supplement to, rather than a replacement of,
the admittedly flawed system of accountability that prevails in this
country.
8 See Otten, supra note 1.
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